My students have been asking questions about how the chemical processes in the brain are related to emotions.
This is forcing me to really think about how neurophenomenology should relate to dualism, monism, panpsychism, reductionism, elimitivism, and other stances regarding conscious states and neural states.
In a broad sense I favor Merleau-Ponty’s notion of la corporeal, which conceives of that physiological body that is observed by science as in some fundamental sense the same as my body, my flesh, embodied me, the foundation of my experience.
What about the specific, in principle falsifiable question of whether conscious experience can affect neural states via “downward causation”? I found a few resources to address this question.
I first encountered this idea in an Omni interview with the eminent neuroscientist Roger Sperry:
“In wrestling with the split-brain problem, I realized that this kind of interaction with objects requires that consciousness have…
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